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Abstract: This study elicits individual preferences for reducing morbidity and mortality risk in the context 
of an infectious disease (campylobacter) using choice experiments. Respondents are in the survey asked 
to choose between different policies that, in addition to the two health risks, also vary with respect to 
source of disease being targeted (food or water), when the policy takes place (in time), and the monetary 
cost. Our results in our baseline model are in line with expectations; respondents prefer the benefits of the 
program sooner than later, programs that reduce both the mortality and morbidity risk, and less costly 
programs. Moreover, our results suggest that respondents prefer water- compared with food-safety 
programs. However, a main objective of this study is to examine scope sensitivity of mortality risk 
reductions using a novel approach. Our results from a split-sample design suggest that the value of the 
mortality risk reduction, defined as the value of a statistical life, is SEK 3 177 (USD 483 million) and SEK 
50 million (USD 8 million), respectively, in our two sub-samples. This result cast doubt on the standard 
scope sensitivity tests in choice experiments, and the results also cast doubt on the validity and reliability 
of VSL estimates based on stated preference (and revealed preference) studies in general. This is 
important due to the large empirical literature on non-market evaluation and the elicited values’ central 
role in policy making, such as benefit-cost analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to guide resource allocation or the pricing of externalities requires 
a common metric for costs and benefits. Monetary values act as this common metric and today there is 
broad consensus that the willingness to pay (WTP) approach to evaluate health risk reductions, which 
was established in the 1960s and early 1970s (Dreze 1962, Schelling 1968, Mishan 1971, Jones-Lee 
1974), is the appropriate approach to evaluate small changes in health risks. Since the early theoretical 
contributions a vast amount of empirical work has been conducted, evaluating a wide range of risks 
(Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. 2011). Whereas there is consensus about the WTP 
approach there has been some controversy regarding the empirical elicitation of individual WTP. 
The motivation for eliciting individual preferences for risk reductions using the WTP approach to 
obtain monetary values is that no easily available market prices exist for safety. Instead researchers rely 
on what is usually referred to as non-market evaluation techniques. These techniques can broadly be 
classified as either revealed- (RP) or stated-preference (SP) methods. The former refers to methods that 
use individuals’ actual decisions in markets that are related to the good of interest. For instance, property 
markets have been used to elicit individuals’ preferences to reduce the level of air and noise pollution 
where the relationship between the property prices and pollution levels has been examined (Smith and 
Huang 1995, Nelson 2008). The RP approach has extensively, especially in the US, been based on labor 
market data where the compensation workers demand for risker jobs is assumed to reflect their 
preferences (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Among economists not much controversy has surrounded the 
empirical application of the RP methods; since actual decisions are used individuals have incentives to be 
well informed and to make decisions that are in their interest. Weaknesses with the RP approach are, 
though, that markets do not always exist for the good of interest, that the analysts may not be well 
informed about the decision alternatives individuals face, and that individuals may not be well informed 
about actual health risks associated with different decisions. 
More controversy has surrounded the second type of method, i.e. the SP approach. As the name 
suggests the SP approach is based on respondents’ stated choices in hypothetical market scenarios. 
There exist a wide range of different SP methods, but the ones that dominate to elicit individual WTP are 
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the contingent valuation method (CVM) and discrete choice experiments (CE) (Bateman, Carson et al. 
2002). The general controversy surrounding these methods among economists (and others) is based on 
the fact that decisions are hypothetical, which means that respondents do not have incentives to be well 
informed when making their decision and that their stated decision may not reveal how they would act if 
the decision would have been real. However, despite the criticism of eliciting preferences based on 
hypothetical scenarios there has been a large increase in the use of SP studies over the past few decades 
(Carson and Hanemann 2005).  The reasons are related to the shortcomings of the RP approach; non-
existing markets, market failures, and/or that the analysts may not be well informed about the decision 
alternatives individuals face. Regarding health risks SP methods have been used to evaluate a wide 
range of risks, e.g. contaminated water (Adamowicz, Dupont et al. 2011), road safety (Andersson and 
Svensson 2008), and cancer (Hammitt and Haninger 2010). The SP approach offers flexibility in creating 
specific markets of interests and allows the analysts to control the decision alternatives. 
The aim of this study is to elicit individual preferences to reduce the risk related to an infectious 
disease caused by the bacteria campylobacter, i.e. campylobacteriosis. Humans are mainly infected by 
campylobacter through contaminated food or water (Taylor, Herman et al. 2012) and we will therefore 
elicit preferences in a market setting where individuals can reduce their risk by consuming safer food or 
water. Since food and water safety are attributes with many features that make them candidates for 
market failures, such as asymmetric information about safety levels, consumers cannot determine the risk 
before consumption (i.e. it is an experience or credence attribute (Antle 1995)), and consumers’ bounded 
rationality regarding the ability to process risk information, we prefer to use the SP approach. However, it 
has been shown that individuals in SP studies have difficulties understanding small probabilities and the 
usefulness of eliciting WTP for risk reductions in SP studies is an area where there has been a lot of 
debate. Whereas the opponents have based their criticism on empirical results which suggest that 
individuals are not capable of understanding the risk-dollar tradeoffs presented to them in SP surveys (see 
e.g. Hausman 2012), the advocates have argued that these results are usually based on bad survey 
design and that more recent surveys, where the methodology and knowledge among analysts have 
improved, provide results where the validity of the results often cannot be rejected (Hammitt and Haninger 
2010, Carson 2012). 
4 
 
We aim in this study to, in addition to eliciting respondents’ preferences, address some 
methodological issues and the main objectives of this study are to: (i) elicit preference for food and water 
safety that can be used for policy purposes, (ii) examine whether respondents are able to treat two health 
variables in CE as separate variables, and (iii) examine the scope sensitivity of respondents’ WTP for 
health improvements. For these purposes we will use data from a Swedish CE study. In CE respondents 
are asked to choose between different bundles of goods, i.e. a good consisting of several attributes. 
Compared to the CVM where respondents state their WTP for one good, either a one or a multi-attribute 
good, CE have some advantages such as being able to extract more information from respondents’ 
answers, e.g. their WTP for the different attributes instead of only one, and to be less prone to strategic 
bias in the respondents’ answers. Regarding our first objective above we take advantage of the former, 
i.e. the ability of CE to elicit WTP for several attributes, and elicit respondents’ WTP to reduce both 
mortality and morbidity risk, and we examine whether their WTP differs whether the improvement relates 
to food or water safety. 
The methodological objectives of our paper are related to the respondents’ ability to reveal their 
preferences for small changes in risk in a SP study. As to including two health variables in CE studies, we 
include both morbidity and mortality risk and we examine whether respondents are able to treat them as 
separate variables or focus on one of them. The final methodological objective, i.e. the test of scope 
sensitivity, has been extensively examined in the literature with different results (but mostly in CVM 
studies rather than CE studies). The overall conclusion is that WTP is sensitive to the size of the risk 
reduction, but not in line with what theory predicts (Hammitt and Graham 1999). The novelty of our 
approach to examining this question is that we for one subsample run a state-of-the-art design where we 
use the actual baseline risk levels and then for another sample use levels that are significantly higher, but 
still reasonable from the respondents’ perspective. This makes it possible to test for scope sensitivity both 
within each sub-sample (whether respondents within a sub-sample prefer policies with marginally larger 
risk reductions) and between sub-samples (whether respondents in a sub-sample with non-marginal 
higher risk reductions report a higher WTP). The former is the standard test for scope sensitivity in the 
literature, whereas the latter is the innovation of our study. The higher risk levels are based on the actual 
levels for road safety for which WTP has been elicited in several studies (Andersson and Treich 2011). By 
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using the baseline level of road safety for which there is much evidence of the range of WTP, the 
conclusions that we draw based on our results are not only relevant for the elicitation of WTP for food and 
water safety, but for the elicitation of WTP using SP methods in general. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we relate our paper to a selection of the relevant 
literature on the valuation of small health risks. Section 3 describes our data collection and shows some 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows our econometric approach outlining the conditional logit and latent 
class models, whereas results are shown in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of 
the results and their place in the literature. 
2. Background 
Today the WTP approach is widely accepted as the appropriate approach to monetize health risks. Other 
approaches that have been, and still are, used are the human capital (HC) approach and implicit 
valuation. In the HC approach the “value of life” is estimated by the individuals’ expected lifetime earnings, 
hence the value reflects the individuals’ assumed marked productivity (Mishan 1982). This approach has 
lost its significance in welfare analysis, however, since the value is not based on individual preferences for 
safety. Implicit valuation is estimated using information from safety policies. By examining the relationship 
between the cost and the health effect of the policy, e.g. the number of lives saved, society’s assumed 
implicit value can be estimated (Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004).1 
The empirical evidence from the literature on implicit valuation reveals a wide range of estimates, from 
negative values, i.e. the program saves more resources than it consumes, to values of several billions 
US$ per avoided death (Tengs, Adams et al. 1996, Viscusi 1998, Sunstein 2002). In general, the highest 
estimates per avoided death are found for environmental risks, for which the risk levels often are quite 
small. The large variation may reflect that other objectives than society’s preferences are important to 
policy makers (Carlsson, Kataria et al. 2011) when allocating their resources and can be criticized for not 
being cost effective. Regarding the latter, this criticism points out that if resources were allocated 
                                                            
1 Here we use implicit valuation to define valuation based on policy decisions. Implicit valuation is, however, 
sometimes also used to define the RP approach, since the estimates from those studies are derived from individuals’ 
observed behavior. In this study we always refer to the latter as RP estimates or valuation.  
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differently, from high to low cost policies, more deaths could be avoided. Ignoring the extreme values, the 
variation in estimates between types of risks and sectors of society can, however, also reflect that 
preferences differ between contexts. For instance, a recent meta-analysis of SP studies estimating VSL 
found that the overall mean VSL from environmental studies was higher compared to the mean VSL from 
health and traffic related studies (Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. 2011). However, overall the empirical evidence 
suggests that the risk-dollar tradeoffs from implicit valuation do not necessary reflect individual 
preferences as estimated in RP or SP studies (Blomquist 2004).  
Most of the empirical research on monetizing individuals’ preferences for health risks using the 
WTP approach has been on mortality risks, i.e. these studies have estimated the VSL. Compared with 
morbidity risk, where the number of endpoints is very large and diverse, there is small variation in the 
number of endpoints for mortality risk, which may explain the focus on mortality risk in empirical research. 
Much of this empirical research on estimating VSL has been in the areas of workplace or traffic safety 
(Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Andersson and Treich 2011) but also in other areas such as general health and 
environmental risks (see Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. (2011) for a review). Whereas the RP approach, and 
particularly applied to workplace safety, has dominated in the US, the SP approach has been more 
applied in Europe and developing countries (Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. 2011). The literature has been 
dominated by the hedonic pricing approach (Rosen 1974) and the CVM (Mitchell and Carson 1989) using 
the RP and SP approach, respectively. Recently the CE approach has gained ground, however. In this 
brief review our main interest is the use of the CE technique to estimate WTP for mortality and morbidity 
risk. 
The CE technique has a relatively long history within marketing and transport economics where it 
has been used to model demand for new products and modes of transport with different characteristics 
(Louviere and Hensher 1982, Louviere and Woodworth 1983). Even though it has been used in both 
health and environmental economics for about two decades (Adamowicz, Louviere et al. 1994, De 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) it is only in recent years, as described, that it has become a popular 
choice to evaluate health risks in both health and environmental economics. Examples of contexts where 
CE have been used to evaluate health risks are transport (Hensher, Rose et al. 2009), health (e.g. stroke, 
7 
 
heart disease, diabetes) (Cameron, DeShazo et al. 2010), avalanches (Rheinberger 2011), contaminated 
sites (Alberini, Tonin et al. 2007), and contaminated drinking water (Adamowicz, Dupont et al. 2011). 
Other studies have used the multi-attribute design of CE to examine the effect of context on respondents’ 
WTP (Tsuge, Kishimoto et al. 2005, Alberini and Šcasný 2011).  
The results from the CE studies on health risk evaluation are in line with results from both RP and 
CVM studies; individuals have a positive WTP to reduce their risk exposure, WTP varies between 
contexts, and the population means of mortality and morbidity risks are similar to values from the other 
evaluation techniques. Reviews and meta-analyzes of the WTP literature on mortality health risk 
evaluation have shown that most VSL estimates fall within the range US$ 1 to 10 million (Viscusi and Aldy 
2003, Dekker, Brouwer et al. 2011, Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. 2011).2 These reviews and meta-analyzes are 
dominated by the HP and CVM methods, but most of the evidence from the CE studies shows similar 
results as the other techniques.3 A recent study that found estimates that were outside this range was 
Adamowicz, Dupont et al. (2011) who found VSL to be in the range C$ 16 to C$ 20 and C$ 14 to C$ 17 
million for microbial and cancer, respectively.4 A difference between their studies and many others in the 
literature is that they estimated WTP for considerably smaller risks than in the other studies.  
In our study we elicit individual preferences for a small risk related to food and water safety. 
Based on the empirical evidence we can, therefore, expect a relatively high WTP compared to many other 
estimates, in line with the results in Adamowicz, Dupont et al. (2011). A weakness with any SP study is, 
as mentioned above, the hypothetical nature of the scenario. Moreover, despite the well-defined ranges of 
WTP estimates for reducing health risks found in the literature, published estimates have been criticized 
for publication bias, i.e. unexpected values or values not in line with previous findings are less likely to be 
published (Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004, Doucouliagos, Stanley et al. 2012). Further, preference 
elicitation related to changes in health risks seems to be cognitively demanding for respondents (Carson, 
Flores et al. 2001). Therefore, since individuals often make decisions based on heuristics (Kahneman, 
                                                            
2 Ranges and reference years for the price levels varies between studies. However, the US$ 1 to 10 million range is in 
line with the narrower range of the estimates using workplace safety data reported  in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).  
3 A topic not addressed thoroughly in these cited reviews is whether SP studies systematically produce higher or 
lower estimates than RP studies. Reviews of the literature have come to different conclusions, though, with, e.g. de 
Blaeij, Florax et al. (2003) finding evidence that SP studies produce higher estimates than RP studies and Kochi et al. 
(2006) the opposite. 
4 US$ 1= C$ 1 (stats.oecd.org, 2013‐04‐07) 
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Slovic et al. 1982, Kahneman 2003), preference estimates for health risk reductions have been criticized 
for not reflecting preferences but attitudes (Kahneman, Ritov et al. 1999). In order to examine the 
robustness of our estimates, and to address the methodological issues related to the hypothetical nature 
of SP studies, publication bias, and risk comprehension, we take a novel approach and design two 
alternative scenarios regarding the mortality risk; one using the actual baseline risk to define the change in 
risk and another using the baseline risk for transport safety. The motivation for using transport safety is 
because there is a large body of empirical evidence, not only internationally (Andersson and Treich 2011) 
but also based on Swedish data (Hultkrantz and Svensson 2012). Hultkrantz and Svensson (2012) 
reported a VSL range equal to USD 0.7 to 8.3 million with a mean and median equal to USD 2.9 and 2 
million. We will use the empirical evidence from Sweden on individuals’ WTP to reduce road mortality risk 
to test the robustness of our results in this study. 
3. The Survey and Data Collection  
In order to address the research questions as set out in the Introduction we administered a CE survey. In 
the experiment respondents were asked to choose between different public policies that were described to 
reduce campylobacter-related mortality and morbidity risks. The policies differed across choice sets with 
respect to the size of mortality and morbidity risk reductions, the source of the disease being targeted 
(food- or water-borne), when the policy would start to have an effect, and the monetary cost of the policy.  
Preferences and WTP estimates for food and water safety are implicitly derived from the 
respondents’ choices in the CE, which answers our first research question. To address the second 
research question we test whether respondents can deal with two health variables in CE by examining 
WTP for the mortality and morbidity attribute, respectively. In addressing the third research question of 
scope sensitivity we created a split-sample design with two sub-samples that were identical in all aspects 
with the exception of the size of the mortality risk reduction. We refer to the two sub-samples as sub-
sample A (smaller risk reduction) and sub-sample B (larger risk reduction), respectively. 
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3.1 Survey Structure 
Following an introductory welcome note to respondents, the survey consisted of four sections. The first 
section contained questions on respondents’ risk perception and attitudes towards food and water safety, 
personal experience of food poisoning as well as a set of questions regarding respondents’ risk behavior 
(e.g. their use of risk-reducing measures in the home environment). Section two described the illness of 
campylobacteriosis to the respondents. The annual incidence was described to be 63 000 in Sweden, 
which corresponds to a risk of 7 in 1,000 (AgriFood 2012). It was further described that 
campylobacteriosis can be categorized as mild, moderate or severe with accompanying symptoms 
described. In section two the respondents were also asked to state their health status using a Visual 
Analog Scale. Section three contained the CE where respondents were asked to choose between policies 
(or the status quo alternative) that differed with respect to the levels of the respective attributes. Following 
the CE part, the fourth section included questions on socio-economics and demographics. After the fourth 
section, respondents could choose to finalize their participation in the survey, but they were also asked if 
they would consider answering a number of debriefing questions. 
In order to design the survey in a comprehensible and clear way we initially tested the survey in 
small focus groups. Following this, we performed two pilot studies on-line with 100 and 50 respondents. 
The feedback from the two pilot studies induced some minor textual changes to the description of the risk 
scenario and some modifications of attribute levels. 
3.2 Attributes and Levels 
The choice experiment was designed with 5 attributes with a varying number of attribute levels: source of 
disease (2 levels), mortality risk reduction (3 levels), morbidity reduction (3 levels), delay (4 levels), and 
cost (3 levels). Table 1 below shows the attributes and their levels. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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 The levels of each attribute were determined based on relevance to the research questions, 
discussions and feedback from a medical expert in the field of infectious diseases, as well as feedback 
from the focus groups. The first attribute listed in Table 1 is the source of disease, i.e. food- or water-born 
campylobacteriosis. This attribute should be irrelevant to respondents’ if they only care about the size of 
the risk reduction, but as showed in some previous research the controllability of a risk may be important 
in order to understand how individuals perceive and value risks (Slovic 2000). Here we hypothesize that 
controllability of the risk is lower for water-borne campylobacter and that this may positively affect the 
valuation of water-borne risk reducing policies. 
 The mortality risk reductions differed between the two sub-samples since, as mentioned, we wanted 
to include a substantial test for scope insensitivity. In sub-sample A the mortality risk reductions varied 
between 1, 2 and 4 fewer deaths per year. This corresponds to reasonable risk reductions given the 
current number of deaths due to campylobacteriosis in Sweden, which was reported to the respondents of 
sub-sample A as less than five cases among the 63 000 people becoming sick every year. In sub-sample 
B the levels were multiplied by a factor of 100 to make the risk reductions in line with road-fatality risk, the 
risk that has been used in the majority of studies estimating VSL in a Swedish context. In sub-sample B it 
was also explained that 63,000 people get sick every year, but the number of deaths due to 
campylobacteriosis each year was not specifically mentioned. It was only stated that in rare events the 
illness can lead to death.5 Not only does this design permit us to test for scope insensitivity, but it also 
makes it possible to relate our estimates based on sub-sample B with the VSL literature in previous 
Swedish and other international studies (Lindhjelm, Navrud et al. 2011, Hultkrantz and Svensson 2012). 
The levels for the morbidity risk reductions were chosen as to represent sizeable effects and to be in 
balance with mortality risk reductions, i.e. neither of the attributes would obviously dominate the other. The 
levels were discussed in focus groups and established in the pilot surveys (they were initially slightly 
lower).  
 The attribute delay, reflecting when the beneficial effect of the policy would start to have an effect 
varied between 0, 2, 5 and 10 years. The cost of the project would be immediate for the respondent, i.e. 
                                                            
5 Based on debriefing questions we have no indications that respondents in sub-sample B considered the attribute 
levels as less reasonable or relevant compared to respondents in sub-sample A. 
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the delay only concerns when the benefits will have effect. The levels for the cost attribute were 
determined partly to cover reasonable ranges for respondents’ budget set, but also to allow for a large 
range of possible estimates of VSL as well as for the value of a statistical illness (VSI) (Lindhjelm, Navrud 
et al. 2011), and finally adjusted based on the results from the pilot studies.   
 On the basis of all possible combinations in the full factorial design, 64 choice sets with two 
alternatives were constructed using a D-optimal design algorithm (Carlsson and Martinsson 2003) 
allowing for all possible two-way interactions to be estimated. The 64 choice sets were randomly blocked 
into eight versions, which imply that each respondent was faced with eight choice sets.  
3.3 The Choice Sets 
Before the respondents were faced with the choice sets a general description of the policy scenario was 
stated as (freely translated from Swedish):  
“[A]ssume that a government authority is considering two different policies that can reduce the 
occurrence of campylobacter; a stricter food control or improved water sanitation. We are interested in 
your valuation of these policies and will now ask you to answer 8 different questions. Apart from the fact 
that the policies differ with respect to the focus on food or water-spread campylobacter, the policies also 
differ regarding: the number of fewer deaths, the number of fewer illnesses, when the policy starts to have 
a beneficial effect and the cost of the policy”.6 
 An example of a choice set, as faced by respondents in sub-sample A, is shown in Figure 1 below. 
As shown, the respondents were asked to choose between two different policies (Policy A or Policy B) or 
choosing the status quo alternative, i.e. preferring to have neither of the policies implemented.    
  
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                            
6 In order to make sure that elicited preferences reflect the health and cost domains as stated in the choice 
experiment it was further explained to respondents that the social insurance system would compensate potential 
income losses and health care costs (if becoming sick). We also included a “cheap talk script” in order to mitigate 
some of the potential hypothetical bias that may arise in SP studies. 
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After the respondent’s first choice he/she was provided some feedback on the computer screen on the 
meaning of his/her choice regarding changes in risk, the cost associated, etc. The respondent was then 
asked if he/she was happy with his/her choice and wanted to proceed to the next choice set or change the 
choice in the current choice set. We found that 16.8 percent of the respondents changed their initial 
choice. In the following 7 choice sets respondents were not given the possibility to change their decisions.   
 It should be noted that the policies to reduce health risks, both in the water- and food-context, were 
described as public policies (rather than private individual risk reductions) reducing the risks for the 
society as a group. The drawback of eliciting “public values” is that they may contain altruistic components 
that may lead to double-counting of benefits (depending on the type of altruistic preferences (Jones-Lee 
1992)). Despite this risk we choose a public scenario, as in e.g.  Adamowicz, Dupont et al. (2011) who 
use a similar approach, since our aim is to obtain “social values” for policy making and also given the risk 
context in this study we argue that it is substantially more realistic to frame health improvements as a 
public policy. With this in mind our estimated values may be seen as a “theoretical” upper bound of the 
true social value of the health improvements.  
3.4 Data 
The data collection took place during the spring of 2012 and was conducted on-line using a web-panel of 
respondents (conducted by the company Scandinfo). Respondents were recruited to the web-panel by 
phone (there was no “self-recruitment” to the panel) in random among internet-enabled individuals in 
Sweden aged 18 and over. This does not necessarily mean that it constitutes a random sample of all 
Swedish citizens, but considering that Sweden has among the highest Internet penetration rates in the 
world (ITU 2012) it is a region where it may be made a strong case for using a web-based study. In total 
1 250 respondents were included, where 1 000 respondents were randomly selected into sub-sample A 
and 250 respondents were randomly selected into sub-sample B. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for sex, age, university education, employment and income for 
sub-sample A and B together with a comparison to national population statistics for Sweden (SCB 2010, 
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SCB 2011). There are no statistically significant differences between sub-sample A and B for any of the 
background variables in the data. In comparison with national statistics our sample corresponds well or 
quite well with regards to sex, age, employment and income. It corresponds less well with the share of 
individuals with a university education (3 years or more); with 32-34 percent of our sample having a 
university education compared to 19 percent in the Swedish population (in the age range 18+).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the sample regarding risk experience and risk perception of 
food poisoning in general as well as food poisoning specifically due to campylobacter. Once again we see 
that there are no statistically significant differences across sub-sample A and B. Eight and 12 percent of 
the sub-samples report to have been food poisoned during the last year, whereas (in both sub-samples) 
eight percent report to have been food poisoned due to campylobacter. On average, the respondents in 
both sub-samples perceive the risk of being food poisoned (during a year) to be larger compared both to 
the incidence of food poisoning reported among our respondents and to objective national statistics. 
Whereas the objective annual risk of food poisoning is in the order of 10 per 100, the average perceptions 
among the respondents are 16.73 to 17.27 per 100. This however is the arithmetic mean. The geometric 
mean, which is common to use when analyzing risk perception since it reduces the effect from outliers 
(Hakes and Viscusi 2004, Andersson and Lundborg 2007, Andersson 2011), is 10.40 and 9.88 for sub-
sample A and B, respectively, and not statistically significantly different from the objective risk. Also 
regarding the perceptions of the individual risk of being food poisoned due to campylobacter the arithmetic 
means suggest that respondents perceive their risk to be above objective average risks; 16.35 to 25.65 
per 1 000 compared to objective risks of 7 per 1 000, but again the geometric means suggest the 
opposite, 3.85 and 4.03. Finally in Table 3 we report data on the respondents’ self-assessed health using 
a Visual Analog Scale ranging from 0 to 100 (with 100 representing “perfect health”), with mean 
responses at 80.09 and 81.94 (levels in line with previous Swedish findings (Brooks, Jendteg et al. 1991, 
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Andersson and Lundborg 2007, Koltowska-Häggström, Jonsson et al. 2007, Andersson, Hammitt et al. 
2013)). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical model 
4.1 Baseline model 
As described in the previous section the individuals who participated in the experiment were asked to 
choose their preferred option out of a total of J=3 alternatives (two hypothetical scenarios and the status-
quo) in T=8 choice sets. In our baseline specification the utility that respondent n derives from choosing 
alternative j in choice set t is given by 
  0 1 2 3 4 5njt njt njt njt njt njt njt njtU sq die sick water cost delay               (1) 
where 0 5,...,   are coefficients to be estimated, njtsq is an alternative-specific constant for the status 
quo alternative and njt  is a random error term which is assumed to be IID type I extreme value. The 
remaining attributes in the utility function are described in Table 1 above.  
The increase in cost necessary to keep the utility of an individual unchanged following the 
introduction of a policy which lowers the probability of dying is given by 
 1
4
/
/
njt njt
njt njt
U die
U cost


       (2) 
This is a measure of the VSL since it can be interpreted as the WTP for a reduction in risk equivalent to 
saving one life. By replacing the variable die with sick, we get the VSI, which can be interpreted as the 
WTP for a reduction in risk equivalent to preventing one case of campylobacteriosis.  
15 
 
Following Viscusi, Huber et al. (2008) we also estimate models in which we interact the delay 
attribute with the die and sick attributes. This is done to test the robustness of the results and to account 
for the fact that a delay in the implementation of a policy may cause respondents to lower their valuations 
of the risk reductions. 
4.2 Latent class models 
The baseline specification assumes that the respondents have identical preferences for the attributes of 
the policies, which is unlikely to be the case in reality. We explore this by estimating latent-class models, 
in which the utility function is given by 
 0 1 2 3 4 5njt c njt c njt c njt c njt c njt c njt njtU sq die sick water cost delay               (3) 
The subscript c, where 1,...,c C , indicates the class membership of the individual respondent. The 
latent class model extends the standard logit model by allowing the preferences of respondents in 
different classes to vary, while maintaining the assumption of preference homogeneity within classes. 
Conditional on membership in class c the probability that respondent n chooses alternative j in 
choice set t is 
 
1
exp( )
exp( )
njt c
njt c J
j njt c
V
L
V
    (4) 
where 0 1 2 3 4 5c njt c njt c njt c njt c njt c njtnjt cV sq die sick water cost delay            is the deterministic 
(non-random) part of the utility function (Train 2009).  Following Hensher and Greene (2003) we specify 
the probability that respondent n belongs to class c as 
 
1
exp( )
exp( )
c n
nc C
c nc
ZH
Z


    (5) 
where Zn is a vector of characteristics relating to individual n and γC is normalised to zero for identification 
purposes. In the application we set Zn=1, which implies that the class membership probabilities are 
constant across respondents.    
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  Combining equations 4 and 5 the unconditional probability of respondent n’s sequence of choices 
is given by   
 
1 1 1
( ) njtT JC yn nc njt cc t jP H L       (6) 
where ynjt is 1 if respondent n chose alternative j in choice set t and 0 otherwise. In the baseline case 
where there is only one class this model reduces to the standard conditional logit model. The parameters 
in the model are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
 
1
lnN nnLL P    (7) 
It should be noted that the number of classes, C, must be specified prior to estimating the model. In 
practice C is unknown, and so a common strategy is to estimate the model with different numbers of 
classes and choose the preferred specification based on goodness-of-fit measures such as the Akaike 
and Schwarz criteria. We return to this issue in the Results section.  
5. Results 
5.1 Conditional logit results 
Table 4 presents the result of the baseline model estimated on sub-sample A and B. It can be seen that, 
everything else equal, respondents prefer policies with lower costs and which lead to greater reductions in 
the probability of death and illness. The average respondent is also found to have a negative preference 
for the status-quo alternative.7 There are no qualitative differences between the sub-samples in terms of 
the sign and significance of the coefficients. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                            
7 This result holds whether we use dummy or effects coding for the water attribute (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 2005). We 
have used dummy coding in the reported models. 
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As explained in section 4 the coefficients in the utility function can be used to derive estimates of 
VSL, and this is where the difference between the two samples becomes apparent, which can also be 
seen in Table 4. According to the model estimated on sub-sample A the VSL is SEK 3 177 million (95% 
CI: 2581-3772) (USD 483 million). In comparison, according to the model estimated on sub-sample B the 
VSL is SEK 50 million (95% CI 31-69) (USD 7.4 million). 
As can be seen in Table 4 results for the VSI are very similar in the two sub-samples at SEK 0.34 
and 0.33 million (approx. USD 0.05 million), respectively. Hence, when changing the mortality risk 
reduction between the two-sub samples, we get large effects on estimated VSL whereas we get no 
statistically significant effect on other attributes such as the VSI. This conclusion is supported by Figure 2, 
which plots the coefficients in the model estimated on subsample B against the corresponding coefficients 
in the model estimated on subsample A.8 The slope of the line in the figure is equal to the relative scale of 
the two models (Hensher, Louviere et al. 1998). It can be seen that with the exception of the coefficient for 
mortality risk and the constant for the status-quo alternative, the coefficients in the models are very similar 
once scale differences are accounted for.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Regarding other results we find that respondents have a preference for policies that are water 
rather than food-based, and that come into effect sooner rather than later. Following Viscusi et al. (2008) 
we also estimated models in which we interacted the delay attribute with the die and sick attributes. As 
explained in section 4 this is done to test whether a delay in the implementation of a policy causes 
respondents to lower their valuations of the risk reductions. We found that the null hypothesis of the 
interactions being jointly equal to zero could not be rejected at conventional significance levels.9 
                                                            
8 The sick and cost coefficients have been multiplied by 10,000 and 1,000, respectively, to have a comparable 
magnitude to the other coefficients. 
9 P-values: 0.24 (sub-sample A) and 0.59 (sub-sample B). 
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We also explored including interaction effects to allow for observed preference heterogeneity. To 
be specific, we interacted the attributes with dummies for age group (<35, 35-55, 55+) and income 
(less/more than SEK 30000 per month). The reference category was a respondent aged less than 35 with 
an income of under SEK 30000 per month. In general the interactions were found to be individually 
insignificant, with no clear patterns in terms of preference heterogeneity. Furthermore, the null hypothesis 
that the interactions are jointly equal to zero could not be rejected at conventional significance levels.10 
5.2 Latent class model results 
Tables 5 and 6 presents the result of a latent class model with 4 classes estimated on the sub-sample A 
and B. The 4-class models were chosen since they had lower AIC and BIC statistics (better goodness-of-
fit) than models with 2 and 3 classes. Furthermore, 4 was the largest number of classes that could be 
identified with the sub-sample B data.11 The models were estimated using the EM algorithm with 
additional Newton-Raphson steps.12 
 The latent class results suggest that there are groups of respondents with markedly different 
preferences for the attributes in the experiment. In both the sub-sample A and B models there is a class of 
respondents who have very low sensitivity to cost - their cost coefficient is insignificantly different from 
zero - and a high sensitivity to reductions in the risk of death and illness. These respondents also have a 
negative and significant status quo constant, suggesting that they prefer to introduce a policy rather than 
maintaining the status quo, all else equal. Conversely there is a group of respondents who have very low 
sensitivity to risk reductions and a positive and significant status quo constant, which can be taken as 
evidence that they prefer to keep the status quo regardless of the benefits of the proposed policy. Finally, 
                                                            
10 P-values: 0.21 (sub-sample A) and 0.13 (sub-sample B).The results from the models with interactions are available 
from the authors upon request. 
11 A 5-class model estimated on the sub-sample B data had one class in which all the coefficients had extremely high 
standard errors, which is a sign of identification problems. Models with more than 4 classes estimated on sub-sample 
A had better goodness-of-fit than the 4-class model, but did not lead to any additional qualitative insights into the 
respondents’ behaviour (see the discussion below). We therefore decided on reporting models with 4 classes for both 
datasets to make the results more directly comparable.      
12 To be specific the parameters were estimated by maximising the log-likelihood using the EM algorithm until 
convergence (convergence was declared when the proportional change in the log-likelihood over the last five 
iterations was smaller than 0.00001). Additional Newton-Raphson steps were then performed, again until 
convergence. The estimations were carried out in Stata using the lclogit command (Pacifico and Yoo 2013) and code 
written by the authors. We estimated the models using several different sets of starting values to reduce the chance of 
the algorithm getting trapped in a local maximum. 
19 
 
there are groups of respondents who trade off the advantages of the policies against their costs, which is 
more in line with the theoretical expectations regarding consumer behavior. 
 The finding that the attribute coefficients are insignificantly different from zero in some classes 
may imply that the respondents ignored some of the information in the experiment, which is in line with the 
growing literature on attribute non-attendance (Hensher 2010). In the context of the present study it is of 
particular concern that we find evidence of non-attendance to cost, as this complicates the calculation of 
VSL. To be specific, individuals who do not take costs into account implicitly have an infinitely high VSL, 
which is clearly unrealistic and likely to be an artifact of the hypothetical setting rather than a reflection of 
true preferences. One possibility would be to calculate the VSL based on the preferences of the 
respondents who did take the cost of the policies into account, but that inevitably raises the question of 
how representative the estimates are of the population VSL. 
 Doing the latter we calculate VSL in sub-sample A and B using only class 3 and 4 respondents.13 
This produces a VSL of SEK 1 555 million (95% CI: 897-2 213) (USD 237 million) in sub-sample A and a 
VSL of SEK 10 million (95% CI: 1-19) (USD 1.5 million) in sub-sample B. In comparison to the conditional 
logit estimates both VSL estimates are lower, and now with an even higher relative difference between 
sub-sample A and B. The VSI is estimated to 0.27 million SEK (95% CI: 0.18-0.37) (USD 0.04 million) in 
sub-sample A, which is relatively close to the conditional logit results. In sub-sample B it is not statistically 
significant and we therefore refrain from providing an estimate.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
                                                            
13 When the cost coefficient and the coefficients for risk reductions are significant in both classes we report the 
average VSL/VSI over classes, using the class probabilities as weights. Otherwise we report the individual class 
estimates for the class in which the coefficients are significant. The individual class estimates are also reported in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
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6. Discussion 
This study employed a choice experiment to elicit preferences for food and water safety related to 
campylobacteriosis. One objective of the study was to elicit monetary preference values to be used for 
policy purposes. However, of major importance were the methodological objectives to examine whether 
respondents’ decisions in CE are affected by only one or both of the health variables, and the scope 
sensitivity of the respondents’ WTP for risk reductions. To answer these research questions we 
constructed a CE study with attributes including different levels of both mortality and morbidity risk 
reductions, where respondents also were randomized to one of two sub-samples that differed (by a factor 
of 100) in the attribute levels of the baseline mortality risk. 
 The results from our baseline model are in line with expectations; respondents prefer the benefits 
of the program sooner than later, programs that reduce both the mortality and morbidity risk, and less 
costly programs. Moreover, our results suggest that respondents prefer water- compared with food-safety 
programs (everything else equal), which is in line with the hypothesis that water risk is less controllable 
than food risk, and hence, WTP is higher for the former. However, when extending our analysis with latent 
class models we find evidence of preference heterogeneity and non-attendance, i.e. respondents ignore 
some of the information in the experiment, which is in line with a growing literature (Hensher 2010). For 
instance, we find a substantial group of respondents who have very low sensitivity to cost and a high 
sensitivity to risk reductions, as well as a group who have a very low sensitivity to risk reductions. In the 
context of CE studies it is of particular concern to find evidence of non-attendance to cost, as this 
complicates the calculation of monetary values of the attributes. To be specific, in our study individuals 
who do not take the cost of the program into account implicitly have infinitely high VSL and VSI. In the end 
we therefore compare our results for VSL and VSI from our baseline model with the latent classes where 
respondents take into account the cost attribute when answering the choice sets. 
Hence, as suggested in the previous paragraph, respondents in our baseline model and a 
subgroup of the respondents in the latent class model do take into account both the health variables when 
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making their choices. That is, there is evidence of scope-sensitivity (i.e. a significant risk reduction 
coefficient with the expected sign) in both models. However, even though we found evidence of weak 
scope-sensitivity, the sensitivity to scope was not adequate across sub-samples which lead to 
substantially different VSL estimates in our two subsamples. In our baseline logit model VSL was SEK 3 
177 million (USD 483 million) and SEK 50 million (USD 8 million) in sub-samples A and B, whereas the 
results in the latent-class model were SEK 1 555 million (USD 237 million) and SEK 10 million (USD 1.5 
million) in sub-sample A and B (Class 4). Hence, with a 100 times smaller risk reduction in sub-sample A 
the VSL is 60 to 150 times larger. In a recent meta-analysis containing 850 estimates VSL was shown to 
vary between USD 4 450 and USD 197 million with a weighted mean VSL at USD 7.4 million (Lindhjelm, 
Navrud et al. 2011). Our results from sub-sample A are at the very high end of the range. Our results from 
sub-sample B fall very well within the range of previous published estimates, and are close to the reported 
weighted mean in the meta-analysis. Moreover, the estimates are in line with previous published 
estimates of VSL related to road safety in Sweden that in a recent review were shown to vary between 
USD 0.7 and 8.3 million with a mean and median equal to USD 2.9 and 2 million (Hultkrantz and 
Svensson 2012). This finding is of interest since the mortality risk level in sub-sample B was based on the 
risk levels for road-mortality risk in Sweden.  
The between sub-sample analysis suggests no scope sensitivity which questions the suitability of 
our VSL for policy purposes; the validity of our estimates as reflecting respondents’ “true preferences” can 
be questioned. Our estimates of VSI are, however, robust between our sub-samples which we expected 
since the risk reductions did not change between the sub-samples. Note, though, that this is no evidence 
that our VSI is a valid estimate of respondents’ preferences. If the morbidity risk reductions also had been 
altered between sub-samples, we may have experienced the same scope insensitivity as for the morbidity 
risk. Our robust VSI estimates only strengthen our conclusions regarding our VSL estimates. Moreover, 
the between sub-sample comparison highlights that even if a study finds weak scope sensitivity based on 
given choice sets, this does not necessarily suggests that the estimated WTP is a valid measure of 
individual preferences. As discussed by Goldberg and Rosen (2007) the systematic and repeated 
questions respondents answer in the CE approach may stimulate a desire of respondents to be “internally 
consistent”, i.e. respondents anchor their decisions on early choices and in subsequent choice sets to a 
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larger degree state to prefer policies with larger risk reductions (and lower prices). This “coherent 
arbitrariness” creates a pattern in the data that will lead to a rejection of weak scope insensitivity within 
samples but not necessarily across samples using different scopes of the risk reduction (Ariely, 
Loewenstein et al. 2003), precisely what we find in our study. 
Apart from adding and addressing a number of concerns with previous established “ranges” of 
VSL estimates in the literature and as used in economic policy, our results add to the broad and extensive 
literature on the validity of SP studies in general, where much focus has been placed on the issue of 
scope (in)sensitivity (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992, Kahneman, Ritov et al. 1999, Carson 2012, Hausman 
2012). Already in the blue ribbon panel convened by NOAA it was stated that scope insensitivity 
constitutes “perhaps the most important internal argument against the reliability of the CV approach” 
(Arrow, Solow et al. 1993, p.4607). Some authors have argued that scope insensitivity is avoidable in well 
conducted CVM  (SP) studies and has highlighted that insensitivity to scope has been rejected in many 
studies (Carson 1997, Carson 2012) and further that it is something also observed in individuals’ behavior 
in some real market transactions (Randall and Hoehn 1996). Others have argued that scope insensitivity 
is likely to prevail in SP studies irrespective of survey design quality, due to concerns such as answers to 
a large extent reflect “moral satisfaction” or expression of attitudes rather than economic WTP for the 
good/program or attribute (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992, Kahneman, Ritov et al. 1999). Irrespective of 
the strength of the different arguments, when it comes to the application of valuing mortality risk 
reductions, lack of near-proportional scope sensitivity (which is almost never found) undermines the 
results and implies very large variances in actual estimates of VSL. And even proponents of SP methods 
(see e.g. Carson 2012) highlight that one area of application that seems to be particularly prone to scope 
insensitivity is valuing changes in small probabilities.14 
If scope insensitivity is particularly a substantial concern in studies estimating VSL, as has been 
discussed by others and highlighted in our study, what lessons can be drawn for economic policy and 
BCA involving effects on mortality? One potential solution for policy evaluations where an estimate of VSL 
is necessary would be to turn to RP estimates using e.g. wage-risk studies. However, it should be noted 
                                                            
14 Note that in our study we used frequencies to avoid the difficult cognitive task of evaluating probabilities for 
respondents.  
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that RP studies may be plagued by the same type of bias shown in this paper. RP studies assume that 
individuals have accurate and complete information over risk differences across jobs or consumer 
products, and that analysts have full information about the consumption alternatives individuals face. 
There are several reasons to believe that there are systematic misperceptions between objective and 
subjective risks across jobs and consumer products and that this leads to inconsistent estimates of VSL in 
RP studies as well (e.g. Hakes and Viscusi 2004). Also, as can be seen in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and 
discussed by Viscusi (2012) wage-risk studies may also be sensitive to data issues and estimates from a 
single country (as in the UK) has been shown to be spread over a large range of values. Hence, in many 
circumstances RP studies may also provide large variations in estimates or, as is relatively common, are 
not possible to conduct at all due to lack of data. Moreover, many RP studies have elicited preferences for 
the same risk contexts, especially studying wage-risk differentials (Viscusi and Aldy 2003), which together 
with the same risk of publication bias mentioned above may have resulted in the well-defined ranges 
found for RP data as well.  
Despite this uncertainty as to the “true VSL”, proponents of SP methods often argue that a fairly 
accurate number is better than no number. Critics of this approach, on the other hand, argue that no 
number may be better than an incorrect estimate from an SP study (see e.g. Hausman 2012). We 
consider both standpoints equally problematic. On the one hand, if we know that VSL is strictly positive it 
is hard to justify setting the non-market benefit equal to zero, even if we are concerned about the precision 
of the estimates. On the other hand, if we are uncertain whether the “true” VSL is USD 8 million or USD 
483 million, the uncertainty of the economic evaluation is so large that it is not very informative to a 
decision maker. We believe that our findings are not only important for future work with CE or any other 
SP technique, but also different RP approaches such as hedonic pricing. We have shown that standard 
scope sensitivity tests are not sufficient to test the validity of respondents’ WTP. Moreover, our findings 
suggest that estimates in line with other studies, which would suggest that estimates are reliable, can be a 
result of analysts using similar methodologies, based on the same or similar risk scenario, and conducted 
in the same geographical area. Thus, standard reliability tests, which examines whether the estimates are 
in line with other findings in the literature, may be misleading. To summarize, our findings cast doubt on 
24 
 
currently suggested policy estimates of VSL based on estimates from the empirical literature, stated as 
well as revealed preference studies.  
To conclude, our results suggest that the standard tests of validity and reliability used in SP and 
RP studies may not be sufficient to examine whether elicited monetary values reflect individual 
preferences. This is important due to the large empirical literature on non-market evaluation and the 
elicited values’ central role in policy making, such as BCA.   
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Tables 
Table 1 Survey description: attributes and attribute levels 
Attribute Variable name Attribute levels
Source of disease water  Food = 0 
  Water = 1 
Mortality reduction die Sample A Sample B 
  1 100 
  2 200 
  4 400 
Morbidity reduction sick 8 000 
  16 000 
  32 000 
Delay delay No delay 
  2 years 
  5 years 
  10 years 
Cost cost SEK 500 
  SEK 1 000 
  SEK 2 000 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of background variables 
Variables Description Sub-
sample A 
Sub-sample 
B 
Swedish 
population 
Male =1 if male 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age Age in years 45.10 
(16.57) 
45.22 
(16.64) 
48.80 
University Education =1 if university education ≥ 3 years 0.32 0.34 0.19 
Employment =1 if currently employed (age 18>) 0.58 0.60 0.63 
Income Disposable household income in SEK  
(1 SEK = USD 6.57, 2012-09-24) 
18 017 
(8 361) 
19 483 
(9 442) 
21 825* 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents in sub-sample A: 1000, and in sub-sample B: 250. 
* 2010 median household income.  
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Table 3 Risk experience and perception: Sub-sample A and B 
Variables Description Sub-sample A Sub-sample B
Food poisoned =1 if food poisoned last year due to any reason 0.08 0.12 
Campylobacter =1 if (ever) food poisoned due to confirmed campylobacter 0.08 0.08 
Public Risk 
perception 
Subjective beliefs regarding annual risk of food poisoning (all 
causes) (objective average risk 10/100) 
17.27/100 
(17.19/100) 
16.73/100 
(18.28/100) 
Individual Risk 
perception 
Subjective beliefs regarding individual risk of campylobacteriosis 
per year (average objective risk 7/1000). 
16.35/1000 
(81.37/1000) 
25.65/1000 
(118.30/1000) 
Health Health status as measured on a Visual Analog Scale 0-100 80.09 
(16.77) 
81.94 
(15.44) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Benchmark models 
 Sub-sample A Sub-sample B 
   
sq -0.362*** -0.419** 
 (-3.93) (-2.23) 
   
water 0.230*** 0.233*** 
 (6.01) (3.08) 
   
delay -0.105*** -0.0973*** 
 (-19.15) (-10.20) 
   
sick 0.0000219*** 0.0000167*** 
 (11.24) (4.63) 
   
die 0.204*** 0.00251*** 
 (13.18) (7.85) 
   
cost -0.000577*** -0.000453*** 
 (-16.30) (-6.70) 
   
Estimated VSLa 3 177 50 
 (2 581 – 3 772) (31 – 69) 
Estimated VSIa 0.34 0.33 
 (0.27 – 0.42) (0.16 - 0.51) 
Number of respondents 1003 250 
Number of responses 8024 2000 
Log-likelihood -8076.01 -1991.46 
AIC 16166.02 3996.93 
BIC 16200.40 4021.58 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a:In SEK million. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 5 Latent class model – sub-sample A 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
     
sq 2.837** -3.148*** -4.192*** -0.0552 
 (2.15) (-6.53) (-13.26) (-0.21) 
     
water -0.402 0.296** 0.735*** 0.345** 
 (-0.86) (2.34) (4.32) (2.27) 
     
delay -0.0231 -0.227*** -0.143*** -0.123*** 
 (-0.15) (-8.60) (-5.17) (-4.99) 
     
sick -0.00000557 0.0000549*** 0.00000971 0.0000405*** 
 (-0.19) (4.04) (0.93) (7.02) 
     
die 0.138 0.259*** 0.319*** 0.137*** 
 (0.44) (3.97) (3.89) (2.65) 
     
cost -0.00164 0.000140 -0.00150*** -0.00133*** 
 (-1.08) (1.45) (-5.98) (-7.01) 
     
Class probability 0 .187*** 0 .335*** 0 .307*** 0.171*** 
 (13.94) (7.08) (6.62) (12.43) 
     
Estimated VSLa - - 1905 927 
   (967 - 2843) (224 - 1630) 
Estimated VSIa - - Not significant 0.27 
    (0.18 – 0.37) 
Number of respondents 1003 
Number of responses 8024 
Log-likelihood -5381.44 
AIC 10824.88 
BIC 10977.11 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a:In SEK million. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 6 Latent class model – sub-sample B 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
     
sq -3.753*** 3.657 0.985*** -3.803*** 
 (-5.89) (1.00) (2.69) (-7.15) 
     
water 0.241 1.302* -0.153 0.954*** 
 (1.15) (1.74) (-0.69) (2.63) 
     
delay -0.237*** -0.215** -0.0838** -0.134*** 
 (-6.46) (-2.09) (-2.29) (-3.91) 
     
sick 0.0000393*** 0.0000855 0.0000151 -0.00000317 
 (3.15) (1.28) (1.45) (-0.22) 
     
die 0.00182*** 0.0361*** 0.0000699 0.00188* 
 (2.61) (3.32) (0.10) (1.93) 
     
cost 0.0000324 -0.000320 -0.000965*** -0.00170*** 
 (0.21) (-0.86) (-4.24) (-5.48) 
     
Class probability 0.363*** 0.120*** 0.263*** 0.254*** 
 (6.55) (4.48) (9.38) (4.90) 
     
Estimated VSLa - - Not significant 10 million SEK 
    (1 – 19) 
Estimated VSIa - - Not significant Not significant 
Number of respondents 250 
Number of responses 2000 
Log-likelihood -1384.22 
AIC 2830.44 
BIC 2939.61 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a:In SEK million. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Example of Choice Set in sub-sample A 
(Today 5 people die and 63 000 people get sick every year due to Campylobacterios. We now 
ask you to state if you prefer a certain policy (or not) to reduce these risks for a given cost. What 
do you prefer?) 
What do you prefer in this situation? 
 
I prefer 
 Policy A       
  Policy B                  
  None of the suggested policies (today’s situation remains and no additional cost for you) 
 Policy A Policy B 
Source of disease Water Food 
Number of fewer individuals who die (per 
year) when the policy is implemented 1 2 
Number of fewer individuals who get sick 
(per year) when the policy is implemented 16 000 8 000 
The policy starts to have effect this year in 10 years 
Your cost (per year) 1 000 SEK 2 000 SEK 
Note: The text in the parenthesis at the top of the figure was only presented to the respondents in the first 
choice set. 
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Figure 2 Plot of coefficients in the two models 
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